

Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000100120002-1

NI No. 1673-77

1 July 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: D/DCI/NI
FROM: James R. Lilley
National Intelligence Officer for China
SUBJECT: Chinese and the Two Front Challenge

1. Action Requested: None. This memorandum is for your information.

2. Background: This provides you with our reasoning on why Chinese defenses against the Soviets would be weakened by a PRC invasion attempt against Taiwan. It is in response to a question you posed at the Sino-Soviet briefing on 28 June.

3. Coordination: This was prepared by OSR. DIA has informally coordinated.

25X1A

James R. Lilley

Attachment:
Memo

cc: DDCI

NIO/CH-JRLilley:fmt 1 July 1977

Distribution:

- Orig. & 1 - Addressee, w/att.
- 1 - DDCI, w/att.
- 1 - D/DCI/NI, w/att.
- 1 - DDI/OSR, w/att.
- 2 - NIO/CH, w/att.
- 1 - NIO/RI, w/att.

25X1

DIA review(s) completed.

Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP83B00100R000100120002-1

Forces Available to China for an
Invasion of Taiwan

1. During our Sino-Soviet briefing, you asked about China's ability to invade Taiwan and still maintain its northern defenses.

2. The forces China would commit to an invasion of Taiwan would depend to some degree on the Sino-Soviet border situation. CIA and DIA analysts agree that the equivalent of some 60 divisions probably would be needed for a successful invasion. Although we carry a total of 49 divisions in the three military regions opposite Taiwan, only 28 are main-force divisions, which are likely to be used in such an operation. The remainder are local force units which are equipped, trained, and intended primarily for area defense operations.

3. The additional 30 or so maneuver divisions projected as being necessary for a successful invasion of Taiwan would have to be drawn from military regions whose main-force units were not directly committed to the northern threat. Included would be at least part of the central reserve of 14 main-force divisions in

the Wu-han region. These central reserve divisions are the same ones China would use as reserves in a Sino-Soviet conflict. Therefore, if the Soviets then launched an attack, China might not have sufficient reinforcements readily available.

4. We hope this note clarifies the draw-down theory as well as the often confusing relationships and roles accorded to China's local defense forces and the main force maneuver divisions. In brief, the combined force of local and main force units represents a total defensive capability while the offensive threat generally is limited to the main force units.

Peoples Republic of China: Military Regions



— Military region boundary
 — Internal administrative boundary
 • Military region capital
 • Internal administrative capital
 — Railroad

CENTRAL
RESERVE